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Westpark Owners’ Ass’n  v. Dist. Ct., 123 Nev. 
Adv. Op. No. 37 (Sept. 20, 2007)1 
 
 
PROPERTY – STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – RESIDENTIAL 
CONSTRUCTIONAL DEFECT 
 
Summary 
Homeowners’ Association’s (Association) petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition 
against partial summary judgment, granted by Eighth Judicial District Court, in a declaratory 
relief action brought by the project developer and contractor (Westpark).   
 
Disposition/Outcome 
Petition granted in part.  The court issued the writ and further instructed the court to 
consider whether and the extent to which any of the alleged defects arose from alterations or 
additions made in preparation for sale, and whether any of the Association’s non-Chapter 40 
claims survive. 
 
 Factual and Procedural History 
Westpark acquired a partially completed residential development located in Las Vegas 
through the bankruptcy proceedings of the original developer, Park Lake Partnership.  Westpark 
proceeded to build an additional 108 units within the complex. While these units were referred to 
as “apartments” in several loan documents, the building permits and certificates of occupancy 
identified the units as “new condominiums.”  Westpark annexed the 108 units into the existing 
homeowners’ association, forming the 144-unit “Westpark Owners’ Association.”   
 Westpark leased the additional 108 units to individual tenants from 1997 until 2003, 
when it began to offer the units for sale on the open market.  At time of sale, Westpark entered 
into separate sales agreements with each buyer.  
 When problems arose between the Association and Westpark, the Association served 
Westpark with a formal NRS Chapter 40 notice alleging numerous constructional defects. 
Westpark responded by filing a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. At issue was 
Westpark’s assertion that the Association was barred from bringing any constructional defect 
claims under NRS Chapter 40 with respect to the 108 units, as the units were not “new” or 
constructed as “residences” within the provisions of NRS Chapter 40.  In response, the 
Association filed answers and counterclaims, alleging claims for breach of implied warranty, 
breach of express warranty, and negligence. 
 The partial summary judgment entered by the District Court generally declared that 
Westpark had “no liability” in connection with the development of sale of the 108 later-
constructed units.  The district court supported its determination, in part, by stating the following 
(pertinent) conclusions of law in the written order: 
• NRS 40.630 defines a “Residence” as any dwelling in which title to the individual 
units is transferred to the owners; 
• [W]hen Wespark did transfer title in 2003, it did not transfer title to a new residence 
as contemplated by NRS 40.615. (emphasis added) 
                                                 
1 By Barbra E. Zess. 
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The Association responded by petitioning for a writ of mandamus or prohibition 
challenging the district court’s entry of partial summary judgment in the declaratory relief action 
in favor of Westpark.  The Supreme Court decided to exercise its discretion to intervene, citing 
Ducharm2 as support.  
 Discussion 
The petition challenged the District Court’s interpretation concerning the scope of 
constructional defect remedies under NRS Chapter 40.  The Court agreed that NRS Chapter 40 
applies only to “contractors” who construct “new residence[s]” or “alter[] or add[] to… existing 
residence[s].”3 
However, the crux of this case is the Supreme Court’s exploration of the meaning of the 
terminology “new or altered residences.” 
 
Meaning of “residence” 
 NRS 40.630 defines “[r]esidence [as] any dwelling in which title to the individual units is 
transferred to the owners.”  The Court rejected Westpark’s contention that the District Court 
correctly decided that Westpark did not construct residences because the units were originally 
built as apartments. Whether or not the units were constructed as apartments or condominium 
units,4 the plain wording of NRS 40.630 instructs that the event conferring “residence” status on 
a dwelling is the transfer of title to a home purchaser. The Court concluded that the purchasers of 
the 108 units became owners of “residences” as that term in defined under NRS 40.630 when the 
2003 transfers of title occurred.  
 
Meaning of “new” or “altered” residence 
 Because NRS Chapter 40 contained no additional definitions of a “new” or altered” 
residence and the parties argued for two different meanings of “new,” the Court declared there 
was “imperfect clarity” in the statute requiring the Court to discern its meaning. 
 The Association argued that “new” does not refer to chronological age of the residence 
and that the contractor is subject to liability for constructional defects in a “new residence” when 
it sells a residence that it originally constructed. The premise for the Association’s argument was 
the purpose underlying the statutory scheme: to protect the rights of homebuyers by providing a 
process to hold contractors liable for defective original construction or alterations.  The 
                                                 
2 State of Nevada v. Dist. Ct. (Ducharm), 118 Nev. 609, 614, 55 P.3d 420, 423 (2002). In pertinent part: “This court 
may exercise its discretion to entertain a petition for mandamus under circumstances of urgency or strong necessity, 
or when an important issue of law needs clarification and sound judicial economy and administration favor the 
granting of the petition.” 
3 NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.615 (2007). NRS 40.615 defines a “constructional defect” as, in pertinent part: “a defect in 
the design, construction, manufacture, repair or landscaping of a new residence, of an alteration of or addition to an 
existing residence, or of an appurtenance and includes, without limitation, the design, construction, manufacture, 
repair or landscaping of a new residence, of an alteration of or addition to an existing residence, or of an 
appurtenance…” 
4 The Court incidentally noted that the District Court incorrectly determined that the 108 units were originally 
constructed as apartments rather than condominium units.  While Westpark may have identified the units as 
“apartments” in several loan financing documents related to the project, the buildings were mapped as 
condominiums, and the building permits and certificates of occupancy identified the units as “new condominiums.” 
The Court concluded that Westpark originally constructed and maintained the units as condominiums that Westpark 
individually owned and rented to third parties 
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Association argued that contractors may thwart this purpose by potential abusive interpretations 
of the statute.5  
 Westpark asserted that, for the purposes of NRS Chapter 40, the 108 units were no longer 
“new residences” because they were occupied for a substantial period of time before they were 
sold to the general public.  The Court agreed that to hold that condominium units occupied for a 
period of seven years are “new” would be absurd – clearly conflicting with the common meaning 
of the term.  
 The Court “divined” the following reasonable interpretation of the term: “a residence is 
“new” when it is a product of original construction that has been unoccupied as a dwelling from 
the completion of its construction until the point of sale.”  In the opinion of the Court, this 
definition preserves the legislative purpose of providing homeowners a fairly expansive remedy, 
as any unoccupied residential dwelling left vacant for a period of time or used as a model home 
before sale is, in general parlance, still a “new residence” under NRS 40.615. This definition also 
avoids the absurd result that a unit occupied as a dwelling for several years could still be a “new 
residence.”  
 
Conclusion 
The units in question were “residences” for the purposes of NRS Chapter 40 because title 
to the 108 condominium units constructed by Westpark was transferred to individual purchasers 
at the time of sale. However, the units are not “new” under NRS 40.615 because the units were 
occupied on a rental basis for seven years before sale.  Therefore, the remedies of NRS Chapter 
40 only apply to the Association’s claims if Westpark altered or repaired the units prior to sale 
and the defects are related to those alterations or repairs. Accordingly, the Court concluded that 
the district court abused its discretion in  foreclosing the opportunity to litigate the Association’s 
claims arising from any alterations or repairs to the 108 condominium units, and in foreclosing 
any of the Association’s non-Chapter 40 claims.  
                                                 
5 For example, the purpose is defeated if contractors may escape the provisions of NRS Chapter 40 by building 
housing units and then waiting to sell the units for a period of time until they are no longer “new.”  Similarly, if 
contractors could circumvent liability by using units as “model homes” or leasing units to “strawmen” for a period 
of time before offering them for sale, the purposes of NRS Chapter 40 are undermined. 
